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1. Japan's economic  outline. 
I 
I 
Japan has a  population of 104  million,and is now  one  of the world's principal 
economic  and  commercial  powers. 
In terms of gross national product  (GNP)  it is fourth in order of size,coming 
after the United States,the hUropean  Communit,y  and  the Soviet Union.  The  figures, 
in billion dollars, are as follows  : 
' 
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926  288(1)  196  991  485  J 
I 
(1)  for USSR -- net material product 
On  the trading side Japan occupies third place. The  export and  import  figures 
for 1970  are as follows  (billion dollars)  : 
I 
1970  The  NINE  !  The  SIX  U.S.A.  JAPAN  USSR 
I 
Imp oris  56,362  45,621  39,963  18,881  11,739 
~port:  52,871  45,198  43,226  19,318  12,800 
Total  109,233  90,819  83,189  38,199  24,539 
Moreover,Japan enjoys a  rate of economic  and  commercial  expansion unparalle[ed 
anywhere  in the western world. 
Since 1955  the  "real"  GNP  (i.e. at constant prices) has  been expanding at an 
average rate of 11  ~annual~. 
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In 20 years total national production has risen 10-fold,with an annual growth 
rate exceeding 11  %.  Between  1967  and 1970 the average rate has been around 
13 %compared with 6 %  for the  OECD  countries taken as a  whole. 
Industrial production  : 
Agricultural production: 
1965 = 100 
1963 = 100 
1970  = 216 
1969  = 125 
Japan is now  the leader in ship-building,the biggest producer of radio apparatus, 
the second largest producer of motor cars,  T.V.  sets and rubber goods  and third 
largest producer of cement.iron and steel. 
In 1970  the  GNP  per head was  $ 1,910. The  Japanese standard of living is about 
half way  between the countries of Europe  and  the other Asian countries.  Estimates 
of the Japanese Finance Ministry suggest that by  1988  Japan's GNP  per head will 
be  the highest in the world. 
Japan's balance of payments  habitually shows  a  surplus.  The  credit balance in 
1969  was  $ 2.4 billion,but in 1970 it was  unusually small,at only $ 437  million. 
In 197l,however, it rose to $ 7.6 billion,and the figure for 1972 will be  about 
$ 6.2 billion. 
2.  The  explanation of Japan's expansion 
Without  the aid from  the United States,Japan's ecomomic  growth since 1945,  could 
not have  achieved these dimensions.  Moreover,  the Peace  Treaty put a  strict liinit 
on  Japan's right to maintain armed  forces;  and  defence expenditure has therefore 
weighed  but lightly on  the Japanese  economy. 
Since 1950 the government  has been  paying special attention to the growth 
industries,encouraging investment of a  technical and  scientific character,rather 
than private consumption  expenditure. 
Up  to 1971  the characteristicsof Japanese economic  policy were  growth,price 
stability,full employment  and  well-balanced external payments. 
The  level of investment is extremely high,exceeding the overall economic  growth.  \ 
Total investment takes 40 %  of the  GNP, which is higher than in e.ny  other industrial 
country.  Investment  on this scale has  been made  possible by  the mechanism  of 
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savings and  bank credit. The  Japanese saves 20 %  of his income;  and  a  bank 
will find it easy to lend 80% of its funds  to industrial undertakings. 
The  economic  growth,however,  would  not have  been so  outstanding without the close 
cooperation which exists between the Japanese government  and  the leading economic 
groups  in the country. 
The  econo~ is dominated  by  about  ten great industrial and finance groups,known 
as the  11ZAIBATSU",  the three leaders being IUTZUBISHI,MITZUI  and  SUMITOMG.  Each  of · 
these includes a  bank,  a  sales organisation and  a  number  of companies.  Inside a 
ZAIBATSU  all the companies  pursue the same  policy and give each other mutual 
support so that each is appreciab~ more  powerful  than would  appear from the 
I 
balance sheet figures. 
3. Prospects 
In September 1970  the Japanese  econo~ began a  period of comparative recession. 
The  GNP  growth rate,which was  9.5 %  in 1970,fell in 1971  to only 5 %.  In the 
basic industries there was  a  decline both in production and in wholesale prices; 
but inflationary trends prevailed in wages  and retail prices.  External trade, 
however,  showed  a  continueddevelopment,with a  1971  increase of 24.5 %in exports 
compared with the previous year. 
The  recovery programme  is angled on  a  monetary and  finance policy calculated to 
promote  a  return to expansion by  means  of reduced interest rates and  major public 
works.  The  year 1972  is thus cast as a  year for setting things right. The  GNP 
growth rates expected for 1972 and  1973  are ·7.7% and 10% respectively-
4. Trade between Japan and  the European Community. 
a.  The  increase 
Japan is the country which  has  shown  the most  vigorous increase in its trade 
with the Community.  During the past 10 years the cow1try's total exchanges 
with the Community  have risen more  than four-fold,whereas the EEC  external 
trade as a  whole  only doubled.  In comparative  terms,too,  the growth is even 
higher than that of the cross-frontier trade inside the Ellie.  Despite this 
rapid growth,however,  the trade between  Japan and  the Community  is only.a -4-
small part of the total on  both sides -- only 2 %  of the Community's  external 
trade and  5.6% of the Japanese.  In 1970  ,  only some  6.7% of Japanese 
exports were  consigned  to Community  couultries,whereas 30.7 ~of the total 
went  to the United States. 
The  distribution of the trade between Japan and  Western Europe  is shown  in 
the following figures  (million dollars)  : 
Exports  1958  1961  1969  1970  1971  1972 
from  Jan-March 
Community  148.8  311.9  820.5  1 117  1 137  609.9 
Gt.Brita:irJ  59.4  137.1  330.3  395.1  416.8  238.8 
Denmark  2.7  8.7  27.7  30.3  35.5 r  20.1 
Ireland  I  0.1  0.2  7.8  11  13.9!  6 
Total 
3 countriEs  62.2  146  365.8  436.4  466.2  264.9 
Total  ) 
9 countri s  211 .-o  457.9  1186.3  1553.4  . 1603.2  874.8 
Imports 
into  1958  1961  1969  1970  1971  1972 
Jan-March 
Community  124  211.2  968.2  1303.2  1635  957.6 
Gt.Britain  105.2  114.6  348.4  479.8  574.2  369 
Denmark  21.2  19.1  50.8  64.6  67.3  41.1 
Ireland  5.4  9.3  12.2  14.7  19.9  11.1 
Total 
3 countries  131.8  143  411.4  559.1  661.4  421.2 
Total 
9 countriel  255.8 I  354.2  1379.fi  1862.3  2296.4  1378.8 
Thus, between 1958  and  1971  Community  exports to Japan increased by 706  % 
and  Community  imports from  Japan by  941  %. 
II 
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In the first quarter of 1972  Japanese  exports to the Community  increased by 
nearly 30 %  ($  Z78  million)  compared  with the first quarter of 1971;  and 
Community  exports to Japan rose by  only 3 %  ($ 148 million). 
b. Structure of the trade  : 
·t/ 
Nowadays  80~of the BEe  imports  from  Japan consist of manufactured goods,whereas 
in 1958  these classes accounted  for only two-thirds of the total. There  was  an 
increase of 318  %under the food headings,resulting from  the considerable 
increase in purchases of J"apanese  preserved foodstuffs under the fish and 
vegetable headings.  The  imports of chemical products showed  a  spectacular 
growth,with 1968  figures 852 %  above  those of 1958.  For ~hinery and  transport 
material,the growth was  even greater,amounting  to over 1,000 %. 
Other manufactured goods  make  up  half the imports of Japanese  origin,consisting 
largely of cameras  and precision instruments,steel products,pearls and  textiles. 
More  than 85 %  of the  EEx::  exports to Japan consist of industrial goods.  Unlike 
what  has happened  to  the exports of a  number  of other countries,  the main 
increase has been in the exports of semi-manufactured and  manufactured goods, 
consisting of industrial goods  other than chemicals,machinery and motor cars. 
Between 1958  and  1968 the increase under the headings concerned waa  753  %. 
The  machinery and  transport material group, though  the increase  (363  %)  was 
less sharp,are still the largest sector in the exports to Japan. 
c. ~de  problems  between Japan and  the Community 
The  EillC  trade balance with Japan still showed  a  surplus  ($ 46  million) as 
recently as 1967,but went  into deficit in the following year.  The  shortfall 
amounted  to $ 150 million in 1969,increased in 1970 to $ 246  million,and in 
1971  rose to a  total of $ 605  million.  The  parity of the Japanese yen was 
fixed in 1949 at 360 yen to the dollar.  This  continued until 1971  and  was 
an advantageous rate for Japan's competitive position in world markets.  In 
the Cl'isis which  followed  the Nixon  decisions of August  1961,  Japan was  con-
strained by  international pressure to re-value the yen  by  16.9 %  to a  new 
parity of'  300 yen  to the dollar. 
As  from  November  2,1972  the Japanese government  has  lowered the import  .. duties 
on  1,685 industrial and manufactured  products,accounting for 68.6 %  of all -6-
Japanese imports.  This action was  taken with a  view  to cu~ailing the unduly 
large surplus in the balance of payments  and  thus to avoid a  further re-
valuation of the yen. 
Since December  1972 restrictions have  been imposed  on  the export of 19 items. 
The  American measures  force Japan to reduce the growth in her exports to the 
United States and are thus an incitement by  wa;y  of reflux to the  sear~ for 
new  markets,more  especially in Europe. 
Tokyo  is now  doing its best to diversify the country's external trade,which 
has too long been angled on  the trade with the United States.  In 1970,Japan's 
exports to the U.S.  were  $ 5,939 million,and imports from  the United States 
were  $ 4,609 million. 
It is+;to be noted that Japan has a  surplus on  her trade balance with the 
United States.  In 197l.this rose to$ 3.2 billion. 
The  prospect of an enlarged European Community  doing some  40% of the world's 
total  exterr~l trade has further increased Japan's interest in the Common 
i;larket,now  that the country's initial targets have  been achieved. 
The  Japanese authorities are fearful of isolationism,such as prevailed during 
the thirties. The 
11Special relationships" between Japan and  the United States 
are now  a  thing of the past;  and  closer links with the European Community  are 
now  matters of political as well as economic  interest. 
Up  toihe present the  only  concrete instrument of the economic  relationship 
between Japan and  the Community  has beep  the  three-year agreement  of 
February 7,1972  on the  exports of articles of cotton covered by  the  Long-Term 
Agreement  on  Cotton Textiles. 
On  November  10,1969 the Council  of the 1Uropean Community  authorised the 
Commission  to enter into exploratory discussions with the Japanese govern-
ment  and  examine  the possibility of a  general trade agreement.  Since then 
members  of the Commission  have  made  frequent visits to Japan. 
' '  ·) 
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M.  Deniau, the Member  of the Commission  who  was  then in charge of external 
Trade,made  the first exploratory contacts in Tokyo  between February 15  and 
February 21,1970.  Since the opening of negotiations in September  1970,  the 
visits to Tokyo  by  members  of the Commission  have  included that by  Herr 
Dahrendorf at the end  of 1970;  President Malfatti  (February 12-18 1972); 
Ambassador  Borschette at the end  of  ~arch 1972;  and  a  further visit by  Herr 
Dahrendorf  (May  9-12 1972). 
On  the Japanese side the KEIDANREN( Organisation of Japanese  Industry)  had dis-
cussions with members  of the Commission  staff (October 25-26  1971);  and 
.11-lr.  Hirahara,  the Director General for .li.:xternal  Trade ,had talks with his 
European counterparts  (May  29-31  1972). 
5. Trade negotiations between Japan and the EID 
On  July 20,1970  the Council of .11-tinisters  authorised the Commission  to open 
negotiations with Japan for a  general trade agreement. 
The  agreement  in question is expected to cover a  three-year period,and to 
provide the highest possible degree of liberalisation in the trade between 
the  two  areas.  On  the Japanese side the target was  to remove,by  the end  of 
1974,  the quantitiative restrictions on  75  %of the tariff headings,for which 
such restrictions existed at the beginning of 1970.  At  the outset Japan's 
"negative list" covered 118 headings.  In September 1971  there were still 40 
of these,  of which  28  were  concerned with agriculture and fisheries products. 
As  of January 1,1972 the number  remaining was  still 39. 
The  Community  was  to endeavour  to eliminate 75  %  of the quantitative res-
trictions existing as of the beginning of 1970.  At  this time  the quantitative 
restrictions applied to Japanese goods  under 151  headings in one  or other of 
the member  countries.  As  of January 1,1972 the number  of headings was  still 119. 
For the Community  the essential condition for liberating the import trade is 
Japan's acceptance of the safeguard clause in the form  in which it is already 
embodied in Japan's bi-lateral agreements with four of the member  countries 
(l!"'rance  and  Benelux).· 
In addition there should be  a  goodwill clause aimed at the ·progressive 
elimination of non-tariff obstacles.  In this connection the Community  would -.8-
like the Japanese to do  away  with the  "Automatic  Approval  System"  which is a 
licenSing system in which there remains  an element  of uncertainty.  Another improve-
ment  desired is the cessation of the system of secret distribution b,y  products of 
global quota allocations. Another is the elimination of obstacles to investment; 
in the more  important industrial sectors,Japanese capital participates to the 
extent of at least 50 %  in most  of the  joint ventures and  other investments in Japan. 
The  intention is to set up  a  joint committee which  should hold regular meetings 
to smooth  out the trading difficulties. 
A first round of negotiations was  held on  September 17-24 1970. 
A second round  took place on  July 6-8 1971. 
The  two  sides did not  succeed in reaching agreement about  the safeguard clause, 
which  the  Community  regards as an indispensable condition of any agreement.  The 
Japanese  expressed the desire to set up  a  mixed  Japan-EEC  6~mmittee on  the lines 
of the Economic  and  I1linisterial Co:wmittee  Japan-USA.  The  Community,however,  does 
not intend to set up  any consultative co1mnittee  except as part of an agreement. 
6. The  saiegua.rd clause - the stumbling block in_ the negotiations 
The  Committee  has asked for the extension to the whole  Community  of the safeguard 
clause currently in operation in the bi-lateral agreements with France and Benelux. 
It regards this as the more  necessary on  account of the restrictions imposed  b,y 
the United States in 1971  and 1972  on  imports from  Japan.  Moreover,  the same  clause 
is contained in the agreement  between Japan and  Great Britain. 
Japan is only willing to agree to  the incorporation of a  consultation clause 
"ergo  onmes"  with the possibility of asking for compensation which would  facilitate 
recourse to Article XIX  of GATT. This authorises a  member  of  GA'I'T  to refrain from 
reducing customs duties,  or·-to impose  import  quotas in the  event of its industry 
being threatened. 
'rhe  question therefore is,whether the Community  should consider a  "temporary 
·arrangement" pending the revision,or re-definition of Article XIX  of GATT  as 
part of the round of international trade negotiations scheduled for 1973.  The 
present  impasse  could be  avoided if the safeguard measures  contained in 
Article XIX  were  to  be  strengthened in such a  way  as to make  it unnecessary to J 
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resort to a  specific safeguard clause in the agreement  between Japan and  the 
1uropean Community. 
The  safeguard clause,in any case, is mainly a  weapon  of dissuasion.  In the future 
the accent will be  rather,  on  the positive aspects of a  "cooperation clause" rather 
than on  the protectionist character of a  safeguard clause. 
7.  Conclusion. 
From  the Community  standpoint,there is a  risk that the prolongation of the 
situation as it now  exists,will lead to an increasing number  of private agreements 
between Japanese and  European companies.  A proliferation of these  "voluntary 
restriction" agreements would,in principle,  be  incompatible with Article 85  of 
the Treaty;  and  they would  be  prejudicial to the expansion of world  trade to the 
extent that they would  not have  been  approved  by  the Japanese and  EEC  authorities. 
The  Commission  nevertheless hopes  that such developments  can be  avoided,and the 
negotiations brought  to a  successful conclusion in a  future which  is not unduly 
distant.  The  need for such an agreement  between the first and  the third of the 
world's trading powers  is becoming daily more  evident.  Economically an .agreement 
between the Community  and Japan would  have  a  good  effect on  world  trade.  The 
political consequences  would  also be  appreciable/as was  pointed out by  President 
IV18.lfatti  when  he returned from  Tokyo  on  .E'ebruary  21  last.  "At  a  time when  the 
world is growing  beyond  bipolar arrangements" ,he said "the voices of Europe  and 
Japan are bound  to be  increasingly clearly heard". 
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